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INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES:

REAPPRAISAL

AND REAPPORTIONMENT

It is with deep respect that I refer to the contribution to the nation which is derived from the Senators of thi s
State.

May I say that the honorary law doctorate from Arkansas

University which is held by John McClellan is most appropriate
in view of his outstanding work in the Senate.

Under his direction,

the Committee on Government Operations has achieved national
renown by bringing a corrective legal light into certain more or
less obscure corners of American life and practice.
As for J. William Fulbr i ght, the contribution of
the former President of this University is one which I have experienced directly in the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Senator

Fulbright possesses one of the finest intellects in the Senate.
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He keeps it honed, moreover, to a razor's edge by a fierce integrity.

His importance to this nation and its foreign relat ions

predates the problem of Viet Nam and, long after that problem is
resolved, his influence for internat ional order wi ll continue to
be felt.
If I were to speak on the public issue which is
most on my mind (and I expect that it is also most on yours) I
would focus on Viet Nam.

Yet, this problem has dominated our

attention for so long that there j_s danger in the excess. Understandably but regrettably, the anxieties to which Viet Nam gives
rise

tend to invite neglect of other grave international

questions.
Viet Nam is a part of our worldwide commitments;
it is not the whol e.

The over-all pattern of these commitments

was in need of deep reappraisal even before the tragedy of Viet
Nam assumed its present dimensions.

The war has not obviated the

need; if anything, it has made it more compelling.

If our own

perceptions do not soon bri ng us to this reappraisal, we may well
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be led to it, helter-skelter, by circumstances which lie beyond
our control.
For many years, there has been a continuous flow
abroad of human and material resources in support of the defense
and other policies of this nation.

Today, the flow is a flood to

Viet Nam, even as it remains heavy elsewhere in Asia and in Europe
and other parts of the world.

There is ample indication that the

worldwide load which we are carrying may be greater than necessary.
Certainly it is already greater than can be sustained at the current
level of national sacrifice.
The effect of the outward drain is felt in many ways.
At home, it bears a relationship to our apparent inability to come
to grips with the situation in the urban areas.

As a case in

point, it should be noted that a special Presidential Commission
has just completed a monumental report on this problem.

The

Commission emphasizes that the crisis in the cities cries out for
a

g~eat

concentration of constructive effort.

Yet, I am frank to

say that in the light of our national engagements abroad, the
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prospects for finding the national will and the resources for this
concentration are not encourag i ng.
The costly overseas commitment also bears relationship to the huge

b~dgetary

deficits and to the pressures of infla -

tion which are generated therein.

Its effect i s felt, t oo , in the

nation's balance of international payments;

fo~

some years

now ,

thi s gauge has flashed the warnings of financial over-extension.
It is n ow clear that we have been trying to do too
munh with too little in the way of national sacrifice.
are going to be necessary.

Adjustments

In fact, they have already begun.

That

is the significance of a recent Presidential order .
which called for a ten percent cut in governmental personnel
overseas.

That is the significance of the sharply reduced alloca-

tion for foreign aid in this year's budget.
judgment, wise

actions~

These are, in my

however limited,they do c omp el more care

i n evaluating current foreign undertaki ngs.
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actions which will require increased sacrifices from the people
of the nation .

That is the meaning of the recent call- up of mo r e

reservists, the ending of certain draft deferments, and other manpower changes .

That, too, is the meaning of proposals to discour-

age travel and investment overseas by Americans and the request
for a surtax on top of the income tax .

Whatever their individual

merit, all of these measures are clear calls for a greater contribution to the
sounding .

nat ~ on .

They are, moreover, only the first note 1 s

There will be more to come, far more, if there is no

curtailment in the present pattern of our

overseas engage-

ment .
That we face an urgent situati_on is largely the
consequence of the heavy demands of the conflict in Viet Nam .

The

war, however, has only underscored what has long been, in fact,
the need for a thorough reassessment of our worldwide responsi bilities.

These responsibilit i es still derive from international

circumstances as they were many years ago .

Yet, we have not had
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occasion to think long and deeply about their present validity.
We have not had occasion to ask whether a kind of obsolescence
or inertia of policy is not exacting an excessive tribute.
May I say that while a thorough reassessment of our
overseas commitments might be carried out by a new Administration,
I reject categorically the notion that it can be carried out only
by a new Administration.

The latter contention is already heard

and you may expect to hear it with ever-increasing frequency in
the months ahead.

In reality, however, we are confronted with a

problem which is deeper than election-year politics.

It goes to

the capacity of both the Executive Branch and the Congress to face
up to the facts of the situation in which we find ourselves.

It

goes to the capacity of elected officials and appointed officials,
most of whom serve in administration after administration, to look
anew and to think anew .

It goes to the national readlness to

bring our responses into line with today's international
realities.

- 7 In any assessment of our situation abroad, it can
be said that our present commitment began with the United Nations
Charter, almost a quarter of a century ago .

People of my genera-

tion thought to end once and for all, as the U. N. Charter terms
it, "the scourge of war."

We sought to replace a hit-or-miss

national control of war with a form of inter national consortium
to maintain the peace .

We acted to initiate a universal system

of mutual security, order and progress in the United Nations .
From the outset, the concepts of the United Nations
Charter did not work or, at any rate, worked very inadequately .
It was not long before the pr1ncipal nations of the world fell back
once again upon the not unfamiliar rivalries of national power and
alliances .

Unlike what had transpired after World War I, the

United States plunged into the vanguard of these practices .

We

took the lead in expanding a system of defense alliances which
reached into almost every part of the globe.

We put our primary

trust for national security in this system and in our own unilateral

- 8 military capacities--especially in nuclear weapons over which

~1e

exercised a brief monopoly,
The So·.fiet Union was the focus of our concerns.
We saw Moscow at the pinnacle of a Communist monolith, with one
side extending down into Eastern Europe and the other resting on
what was presumed to be a Soviet=enslaved China.
Communist parties and leaders

ev~~here

dancing to tunes played by Stalin.
able bear.

We viewed all

in the world as puppets

We saw Communism as an insati-

We saw it as the tentacles of a giant octopus.

We

saw it in many other forms and shapes--hideous , inhun1an and
irreconcilably hostile.
Over-simplified or not, this concept was of great
significance after World War II

in precipitating the massive

expansion of our overseas commitments.

It induced

once wary of any involvement beyond the Western

th ~ s

nation,

Hemispher~

accept unprecedented internat i_onal responsibilities.

to

The fear

of Soviet expansion was not the only factor in thj_s process.
Rather, that fear was interwoven with an intellectual revulsion

- 9 against any return to prewar isolation, with a deep-seated American idealism for peace and with a broad sympathy for the countless
millions of the less fortunate on earth.
Sometimes with reluctance, sometimes with enthusiasm, but invariably with a new sense of leadership, this nation
launched . programs of many kinds throughout the world.

The

magnitude of th ·is effort is suggested by the over-all totals of
aid since 1946.

To date, the United States has provided in the

neighborhood of $130 billion in grants and loans to about 120
nations.
In the pursuit of a fool-proof security, moreover,
we entered into defense treati es with so robust an enthusiasm
that the term "pactomania" found its way into the language .

By

1954, there were formal defense ties with 42 nations, most of whom
were embraced by three great regi onal alliances.

The Inter-Ameri -

can Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance included all of the Latin
American nations.

The North Atlantic Treaty stretched across

the ocean and to the Eastern Mediterranean to tal<:.e in Greece and
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Turkey.

The SEATO Treaty brought us into defensive concert with

ten nations on behalf of the security of the Asian and Pacific
region.
After 1954, additional

colli~tries

received assur-

ances in the nature of defense commitments from the United States.
By this process, Spain, Iran and Liberia were brought under a
kind of protective wing of this nation and so, too, were both the
Arab states and Israel.

Finally, in 1962, this nation felt

compelled to advise India and Pakistan--both recipients of U. S.
military aid against Communism--that if one, instead, used this
assistance against the other, the United States would undertake
to act on behalf of the victim.
In short, as of today, by request or otherwise, by
formal treaty or otherwise, more than 50 nations have received a
chit--a commitment--from the United States which is redeemable
for some kind of military assistance in a crisis.
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Over the years, we have undergirded these pledges
with elaborate b i lateral and multilateral military organizations.
There has come into existence

unified military commands such as

NATO in Europe and SEATO in Southeast As ia.

Cement for these

structures has been supplied by mass i ve input s of

u. s.

aid.

Over the years our defense undertakings ha ve grown
unti l, today, we station overseas a million and a half of the
three and a half million Amer i cans in uniform.
of course, i s

Heading the list,

the cont i gent of more than 500,000 i n Viet Nam.

There a re 200,000 located elsewhere in the Far East and 350,000
are i n i nstalla tions in Europe and t he Mediterranean.
Some concept of the co st is t o be found in the
military expendi tures in Viet Nam and in the over-all expenditure s
of the Department of Defense.

The cost of the war i s c onserva-

tively estimated at upwards of $25 billion a year.

Tnat figure

i s 31 percent o f the budget of the Depa rtment of Defense whi ch
i s $80 b il l ion.

The t otal f or the Department of De fense, i n

turn, is 42.9 percent of all federal expendi tures.
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As I have already indicated, it was an initial
concern with Soviet expansion which did so much to precipitate
our vast overseas commitment.

This concern began to be felt

almost immediately after the guns of World War II were stilled.
It was felt in quarrels and disagreements among the victors over
the peace treaties.

It was felt, too, in propagandistic strutting,

often over minor questions which came before the United Nations
in its early years.

It was felt in the irreconcilable posit ' ons

which were taken on the fundamental issue of international control
of nuclear energy.

The concern was intensified as the Soviet

blockade of Berlin was followed by tre cataclysmic collapse in
China and, finally, by the Korean conflict.
The military alliances and the aid which we

pro-

vided did act to bu) ld up armed strength in Europe as a counterpoise to Soviet Communism.

Economic assistance did help the

nations of Europe to rebuild their economies and, hence, the
security of the i r free soc i et ies; and i t di d open, at l eas t, the
poss i b i l i tres of modern progress i n many n eglect ed and n ewl y
i ndependent nations of the world.

- 13 In the years after World War II, we had ample
resources for these undertakings .
unscathed from the conflict .
dynamic growth .

Our economy had emerged

It had entered on a period of

The accumulation of neglected inner problems

was not yet of towering dimensions .

In brief, with little strain

at home, we were able to engage ourselves widely in these unde rtakings abroad.
Today, our internal circumstances are not as they
were a decade and a half ago .
and a half ago .

Nor is the world as it was a decade

These two factors, which are fundamental in the

design of effective foreign policy, have changed very greatly .
Can it be said, however, that the policy itself- -the fusing of
understanding, idea and commitment which should form policy--has
been adjusted adequately in the light of these changes?

It seems

to me most doubtful that it can be so said. On the contrary, a
foreign policy grown routine over many years may well be taking
too much out of this nation.

It may well have become wastefUl,

- 14 to say the least.

Even more serious, it may have become of increas

ing irrelevance to the situation which now exists in the world.
As a case in po i nt, it seems to me that the situation in Europe bears close examination.

In Europe--in the two

Europea, East and West--the mutual fears of an earlier time have
receded.

The level of cordiality among governments is rising as

it is among the peoples of Europe.

The barriers are coming down.

Trade, travel, and other exchange, from the Atlantic to the Urals,
is beginning to flourish.
In Western Europe, the once war-devastated democracies have raised their economies to levels of unprecedented
productivity and prosperi ty.

From a desperate financial depen-

dency on American assistance two decades ago, some of our allies
have become holders and even manipulators of great dollar surpluses.

These surpluses are formed i n part from usual commercial

sources such as American tourist expenditures and investments in
Europe.

They are also created in large part, however, from heavy
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U. S. government spending abroac in pursuit of various commitments,
especially the military commitment to NATO.
involves the maintenance of six U.

s.

This commitment

divisions in Eur0pe which,

together with dependents,numbers 600,000 Americans.
It should be noted that these Americans are in
Europe in accord with a Senate recommendation which was made
17 years ago.

In 1951, the Senate urged that the U. S. troop

commitment in Europe be raised from the two

under-

strength divisions remaining after World War II to a pledge of
six divisions for NATO.

This recommendation was put promptly

into effect.
By way of contrast, last year, a resolution was
sponsored by

44 Senators which recommended a return of a substan-

tial part of these six divisions to the United States.

I have

felt for many years that our commitment to NATO could be cut back
to two divisions at a great

sav ~ngs

of resources and without in

any way lessening the significance of our pledge of mutual
defense under the North Atlantic Treaty.

- 16 Unlike 17 years ago, however, there has been no
prompt response to these suggestj_ons from the Senate.

There has

been, on the contrary, a determined resistance to any adjustments
downward in the U. S. force-levels in Europe.

Ignored is the

fact that we alone of all the participants have met our pledges
to NJl_TO.
reduction.

Unheeded have been the pleas from the Senate for a
Unnoticed, or at any rate ignored,have been the obvi-

ous changes in the European situation--the relaxation between
Eastern and Western Europe.

Overlooked has been tre growing

European indifference to NATO.
Last year, it was announced that there would be
a token redeployment to the United States of 35,000 men and their
dependents out of the 350,000 American forces stationed in Europe.
The redeployment was scheduled to begin on January 1, 1968.

On

January 25, 1968, however, it was announced that the redeployment
has been postponed for lfadministrative reasons.

11

In short, six American divisions,with dependents,
remain assigned to Europe, today, as they were a decade and a
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The response to the f i nancial drain which they repre-

sent so far has been largely confined to the discouragement of
private American travel and investment abroad.
Elsewhere, there are also changes to which our
policies have been slow to adjust, if,in fact,they have adjusted
at all.

The concept of a Communist monolith which did so much to

shape our basic policies has long since toppled.

Many years ago

Yugoslavia chose a path of national Communism, independent of
Soviet · domination.

Over the years, the Yugoslavianexperience

has proved to be not an isolated phenomenon but an accurate foreshadowing of reassertions of national independence throughout
Eastern Europe.

Fa r from be i ng cogs in a Russian war machine,

the nat ions of that reg ion are emphasizing the i r own national
needs.

To satisfy them--they are heavily economic--they are turn-

i ng wi th frequency and ever-increasing self-assurance to t j_ es with
the Western European nations and other non-Communist countries.
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Asia, a China which once was seen as an obse-

qu.ious handmaide,1 of Moscow has chosen so fiercely an independent
posit .i on that it '1s.s skirted open hostility with the Soviet Union.
At least, such

the case prior to the intensification of the

wa~

war in Viet Nam.

For sometime, China, too, has been exploring

contacts with the ::E:st of the world.

Despite the setback of the

recent ideological upheavals and the counter-pressures of Viet Nam,
this process is likely to be resumed now that a measure of internal
order has returned.
There have been other significant developments
which relate to the continuing validity of our costly overseas
commitments.

About 50 nations, for example, have become inaepen-

dent and members of the U. N. since 1954; yet that organization
has been allowed to lose significance as a factor in the resolution of the world's difftculties.

France and China have joined

the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom as
possessors of nuclear weapons; and it is said that just one

- 19 explosive in the bulging nuclear arsenals has as much explosive
power as has been used in all wars s i nce the invention of gunpowder .

Yet, the approach to serious disputes, whethe r in the

Middle East or Southeast As i a or wherever, suggests little awareness of the tic king of the doomsday clock .
In sum, it is apparent that the envi ronment in
whi ch the United States must seek its secur ity , today, is vastly
different from what i t was a few year s ago .

It is also appar ent,

t oday, that t here are flaws in the instruments of policy by which
we have pursued our securi ty over the years .

The concept of mutual

defense, for example, has been and remains, i n pra ctice, overwhelmingly we ighted on the side o f the Ameri can contribution of
resources even though other nati ons are quite capable of i nc r easi ng their contribut i ons .
Forei gn a i d, t oo , h a s been seen not alwa ys t o
yiel d the i ntended result .

I ha ve mentioned how ass i stance t o

bot h I nd ia a nd Pakista n t o counter Communist pressures compelled
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us, in the end, to give an addit i onal commitment of support to
each of these nations as against the possible aggression of the
other .

Similar ironic developments are discernible in Latin

America and elsewhere .

In short, while we may point the blade of

military aid in 0ne direction, once the sword is in other hands,
it is not always possible to say where or when it will fall .
It is now apparent, too, that economic aid does not
act in non-i.ndustrialized nations as it did in helping the industrialized nations of Europe and Japan to reconstruct war-damaged
economies .

Thus, the great effectiveness of the Marshall Plan

has had only the faintest of echoes elsewhere in the world,

Aid

in Asia and Africa does not necessarily spur progress or strengtheL
freedom .

Indeed, on occasion it may offer a means for evading

the one and for stunting the growth of the other.
Finally, it is now apparent that our resources for
the uses of international security are not unlimited.

Despite

great wealth, we cannot continue to spend on overseas c ommitments
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at the present rate and still meet the growing internal needs of
this nation.

Certa i nly, we cannot do so without large increases

in taxes, much more regimentation, and other sacrifices on the
part of all Americans.

To put it bluntly, we have learned that

we cannot allocate $25 billion a year or more on war in Viet Nam,
billions more for defense elsewhere in As j_a, in Europe, and other
parts of the globe, and sti ll invest at home in education, health,
housing, transportation, control of air and water pollution,
police protection, or whatever, at a rate whi ch is vital to the
inner stability of this nation.
Most important, we are learning in Viet Nam, at a
tragic cost tha t an i mmensity of military power is not enough to
safeguard peace or to yield a relevant freedom.

It is not enough

in a situation where the issues in conflict are not black and
white but many shades of grays.

We are learning, too, in Viet

Nam that what may begin as a modest effort to assist others can
become a nightmare of destruction and a major military involvement
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for this nation.

Uncurbed, it can grow as an open-ended war

until there is no exit for any nation--except in the final i diocy
of the nuclear devastation of the earth.
These are the considerations which strongly urge,
it seems to me, a continuing and intensive appraisal of our
commitments abroad.

It is an appraisal whtch should take place

throughout the nation no less than in the Executive Branch of the
government and in the Senate.

There is a great need for national

soul-searching at this critical moment in the history of the
Republic.
It seems to me already evident that the time is
past due for reducing the one-sided emphasis on the American contribution in safeguarding the security of freedom and peace in
the world.

I would urge, in this connection, as I have urged

many times before,and as the Senate urged only a few months ago
by unanimous resolution,that the potentialities of the United
Nations be openly engaged with a view to searching out the path

- 23 to an honorable ending of the war in Viet Nam.

In this connec-

tion, too, I would urge once again-as I have urged many times
before and as many Members of the Senate have urged--that a
substantial reduction of U.

s.

forces in Western Europe begin

without further delay.
_ In my judgment, these adjustments are urgent.
They need not wait for reappraisals.
time and again.

They have been appraised

They are needed, now, in an effort to bring

our commitments into better rapport with the current international
situation and with the inner needs of this nation.

They are

needed,now, to check the drift of this nation towards an isolated
and, hence, irrelevant internationalism.

